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Abstract
The fuzzy commitment scheme is a cryptographic primitive that
can be used to store biometric templates being encoded as fixed-length
feature vectors protected. If multiple related records generated from
the same biometric instance can be intercepted, their correspondence
can be determined using the decodability attack. In 2011, Kelkboom
et al. proposed to pass the feature vectors through a record-specific
but public permutation process in order to prevent this attack. In this
paper, it is shown that this countermeasure enables another attack also
analyzed by Simoens et al. in 2009 which can even ease an adversary to
fully break two related records. The attack may only be feasible if the
protected feature vectors have a reasonably small Hamming distance;
yet, implementations and security analyses must account for this risk.
This paper furthermore discusses that by means of a public transfor-
mation, the attack cannot be prevented in a binary fuzzy commitment
scheme based on linear codes. Fortunately, such transformations can
be generated for the non-binary case. In order to still be able to pro-
tect binary feature vectors, one may consider to use the improved fuzzy
vault scheme by Dodis et al. which may be secured against linkability
attacks using observations made by Merkle and Tams.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg [1] proposed the fuzzy commitment scheme
which is considered as an alternative to cryptographic password hashes in
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which passwords are replaced by samples measured from an individual’s
biometric characteristic such as, for example, his eyes’ irises [2]. Given a
biometric template the fuzzy commitment scheme can be used to generate
a protected record from which it is hard to derive the template unless a suf-
ficiently similar template is presented. Making certain assumptions on the
distribution of the biometric templates, the fuzzy commitment scheme prov-
ably provides a certain resistance against irreversibility attacks. There are,
however, more risks than mere irreversibility attack scenarios. For exam-
ple, the ISO/IEC 24745:2011 international standard [3] explicitly prohibits
that the relation between records generated from the same biometric char-
acteristic can be recognized, i.e., the unlinability requirement. In fact, as
for example investigated by Simoens et al. [4], an intruder can link two (or
more) related records generated by a fuzzy commitment scheme via the de-
codability attack. In order to prevent the decodability attack, Kelkboom et
al. [5] proposed to pass the biometric templates through a record-specific
but public permutation process.
On the other hand, the countermeasure makes the scheme vulnerable
to a generalized decodability attack also considered in [4]. More precisely,
even though the performance of decodability attack-based cross-matching
is effectively reduced, an adversary may still be able to recognize records
protecting very similar templates and may now even recover the biometric
templates explicitly. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this observation
is novel.
1.1 Contribution and Outline
After having briefly discussed work that is related to the topic of this paper,
in Section 2 we review the functioning of the fuzzy commitment scheme,
repeat the decodability attack, the countermeasure proposed by Kelkboom
et al. [5], and the generalized decodability attack. In Section 3 we show how
the countermeasure can be exploited by an intruder to run the generalized
decodability attack and demonstrate its applicability by reporting experi-
mental results. Furthermore, we discuss problems with designing effective
and feasible countermeasures in a binary fuzzy commitment scheme. In
Section 4 we propose a modification of the countermeasure proposed in [5]
that effectively prevents a general class of decodability attacks against non-
binary fuzzy commitment schemes. For the binary case, we briefly discuss
some simple approaches to fix the problem and finally propose to consider
the possibility of using the improved fuzzy vault scheme by Dodis et al. [6]
for template protection which, in combination with ideas given by Merkle
and Tams [7], can be secured against known linkability attacks. Conclusions
and an outlook are given in Section 5. The appendix contains an example of
reproducing our experiments using our C++ software library that has been
made public for download.
2
1.2 Related Work
There are other schemes, for example the fuzzy vault scheme [8,9] that, as the
fuzzy commitment scheme, belongs to a general class of protection schemes
called fuzzy sketches [6]. As for the fuzzy commitment scheme, there do also
exist attacks via record multiplicity against these schemes [7,10,11]. Blanton
and Aliasgari worked out the fact that none of these can be safely reused
unless being encrypted with secret keys [12]. In fact, using information-
theoretic arguments one may argue that, by means of public transformations,
the problem of record multiplicity attacks cannot be solved. On the other
hand, we stress that these measures still have the potential to render the
computational complexity of such attacks infeasible.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Throughout, by F we denote a fixed finite field. By Fn we denote the set
of all column vectors over F of length n; for v ∈ Fn we denote by v⊤ the
corresponding transposed row vector and by |v| we denote the Hamming
weight of v, i.e., the number of positions in v that are non-zero. By Fn×k
we denote the set of all matrices over F with n rows and k columns. Given
a linear error-correcting code C ⊂ Fn, we denote by G ∈ Fn×k one of its
generator matrices such that C = {G · m | m ∈ Fk} (note that in the
literature there exists also the convention to define the transposed G⊤ as
the generator matrix); consequently, we denote a check matrix of C by a
matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×n of full rank such that H ·G = 0.
2.2 The Fuzzy Commitment Scheme
In this paper, we consider fuzzy commitment schemes based on linear error-
correcting codes over an arbitrary finite field F. Let C ⊂ Fn be an (n, k, d)-
error-correcting code of block length n, dimension k and minimal distance
d such that it is capable of rounding every r ∈ Fn to its closest codeword
c provided that |c − r| ≤ (d − 1)/2. For more details on the concept of
error-correcting codes we refer to one among the good textbooks available
in the literature, for example [13].
Let w ∈ Fn be a feature vector encoding a biometric template extracted
from some biometric modality. A codeword c ∈ C is selected randomly and
is then used to protect w by publishing the fuzzy commitment f = c+w. In
order to allow safe recovery of the correct template on genuine verification,
we sometimes store a cryptographic hash value h(c) along with the fuzzy
commitment such that (f , h(c)) is considered as the protected record.
If we assume, for simplicity, that the biometric feature vectors are dis-
tributed uniformly among all w ∈ Fn. Then finding the correct template
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w from the record f is as hard as iterating through all codewords in C or,
if accessible, reverting the cryptographic hash h(c) [1]. It is important to
note, that in an analysis the assumption that feature vectors are distributed
uniformly among all Fn typically leads to severe overestimation of system
security.
On verification, an allegedly genuine user provides a template w′ ∈ Fn
that is used to be verified against the record (c + w, h(c)). If |w − w′| ≤
(d−1)/2, then c+w−w′ differs from c in not more than (d−1)/2 positions,
thus can be rounded to c using the decoder; the correctness of the codeword
c can be verified using h(c) if part of the record, which is deemed to be
an accept. Otherwise, if |w − w′| > (d − 1)/2, the decoder might output a
codeword c′ that (most likely) is different from the correct codeword c, or
fail to decode; both cases are considered as a reject.
2.3 Decodability Attack
Assume that an intruder has intercepted two fuzzy commitments f1 = c1+w1
and f2 = c2+w2 and wants to decide whether they are related, i.e., whether
they protect templates w1 and w2 with |w1 − w2| ≤ (d − 1)/2; note that,
the adversary does not necessarily aim at recovering w1 or w2. Therefore,
he computes the offset r = f1 − f2 = (c1 − c2) + (w1 − w2). Since C is
linear, c1 − c2 ∈ C. Thus, if |w1 − w2| ≤ (d − 1)/2, the offset r can be
successfully decoded to a valid codeword; otherwise, if |w1 − w2| > (d −
1)/2, the decoding attempt is supposed to output a valid codeword with
the non-zero probability |F|k−n
∑⌊(d−1)/2⌋
j=0 (|F|−1)
j
(
n
j
)
called sphere packing
density of C. Consequently, if the sphere packing density is small (or even
negligible), the adversary can assume that decoding r yields a valid codeword
only if f1 and f2 are related.
Since the sphere packing density is non-zero, the decodability attack
might falsely label two non-related records as related. Therefore, the per-
formance of decodability attack-based cross-matching performance is worse
than the system’s operational performance [4, 5]. On the other hand, if the
sphere packing density is negligible, the cross-matching performance can be
very close to the operational performance.
2.4 Prevention via Record-Specific Permutation Processes
In 2011, Kelkboom et al. [5] proposed the incorporation of a public record-
specific permutation process to prevent the decodability attack. Therefore,
let P ∈ Fn×n be a permutation matrix. Instead of letting c+w be the fuzzy
commitment, we set f = c+ Pw and publish (f ,P) as the record.
Now assume that an adversary has intercepted two records (f1,P1) and
(f2,P2) where f1 = c1 + P1w1 and f2 = c2 + P2w2. Then, since P1 and P2
are random, we can assume that the vectors P1w1 and P2w2 are random.
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For the offset r = f1 − f2 to be decodable, |P1w1 − P2w2| ≤ (d − 1)/2
must be fulfilled the probability of which can be estimated with the sphere
packing density of C. Thus, the cross-matching performance based on direct
application of the decodability attack becomes close to random.
Kelkboom et al. [5] have not considered the following generalization of
the decodability attack which, in fact, can be applied by an adversary to
determine whether two records protect feature vectors of small difference
and even recover them explicitly.
2.5 Generalized Decodability Attack
Simoens et al. [4] also considered the case in which the adversary has in-
tercepted two records f1 = c1 + w1 and f2 = c2 + w2 where c1 and c2
are codewords from different codes C1 and C2, respectively. As before let
r = f1 − f2. Denote by G1 ∈ F
n×k1 and G2 ∈ F
n×k2 generator matrices for
C1 and C2, respectively, let G˜ = (G1|G2) ∈ F
n×(k1+k2) be the concatenation
of the columns of G1 and G2, and write e = w1 − w2 for the error pattern
between the feature vectors. If we write C˜ = { G˜m | m ∈ Fk1+k2 } for the
code being generated by G˜, then attempting to decode r in C˜ leads to a
generalized decodability attack.
In general it is not clear how to efficiently decode the offset r, even if
efficient decoders are available for C1 and C2. However, if the difference
between the feature vectors is small, i.e., if the error pattern e = w1 − w2
is of small Hamming weight, then maximum likelihood decoding may be a
feasible solution to implement the decodability attack. In the following, we
describe the procedure in more detail.
Iterate through all e1, e2, ... ∈ F
k of Hamming weight less than or equals
a small bound b. If in the jth iteration ej = w1 − w2, then c˜ = r − ej ∈ C˜
and we may label f1 and f2 as related; otherwise, if for all tested ej we have
r − ej /∈ C˜, the records are labeled as non-related.
Irreversibility
If the correct error pattern ej = w1−w2 can be recovered and if the matrix
G˜ has rank k˜ = k1 + k2, then we can even fully recover the feature vectors
w1 and w2. More specifically, we can find a unique m˜ ∈ F
k1+k2 solving
c˜ = G˜m˜. Write m˜⊤ = (m⊤1 | −m
⊤
2 ) where m1 ∈ F
k1 and m2 ∈ F
k2 . Then,
c1 = G1m1 and c2 = G2m2 (note that, if hash values h(c1) and h(c2) are
stored along with f1 and f2, respectively, the correctness of c1 and c2 can
even be verified). Finally, the feature vectors can be determined via the
relations w1 = f1 − c1 and w2 = f2 − c2.
If G˜ has rank k˜ < k1 + k2, the solution of m˜ is not unique. However,
there exists such an m˜ yielding the correct c1 and c2. Therefore, depending
on the rank of G˜, the adversary gains advantage for fully recovering feature
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vectors w1 and w2 of small Hamming distance from f1 and f2.
3 Decodability Attack in a Fuzzy Commitment
Scheme with Public Record-Specific Permuta-
tion
In this section, we consider a simple transformation from the problem of
cross-matching two records generated by the fuzzy commitment scheme of
which feature vectors have been passed through public record-specific per-
mutation processes to the problem of cross-matching two records generated
by the fuzzy commitment scheme based on different codes.
3.1 The Attack
Let (f1,P1) and (f2,P2) be two records generated with a fuzzy commitment
scheme based on an (n, k, d)-code C over the field F. More precisely, f1 =
c1 + P1w1, f2 = c2 + P2w2, where c1, c2 ∈ C and w1, w2 ∈ F
n both encode
biometric templates.
Let G ∈ Fn×k be a generator matrix of the code C and set G1 = P
−1
1 G
and G2 = P
−1
2 G. Denote by C1 and C2 the codes being generated by
G1 and G2, respectively. Furthermore, write c
′
1 = P
−1
1 c1 and c
′
2 = P
−1
2 c2
which are codewords in C1 and C2, respectively. Then P
−1
1 f1 = c
′
1 + w1
and P−22 f2 = c
′
2 + w2 are fuzzy commitments constructed over C1 and C2,
respectively. This situation is equivalent to the attack scenario of Section
2.5 and leads to the following attack.
Algorithm 1 (Modified Decodability Attack).
Input A linear code C ⊂ Fn given by its generator matrix G ∈ Fn×k;
two records (f1,P1) and (f 2,P2) where f1 and f2 are of the form c1 + P1w1
and c2 +P2w2, respectively, where c1, c2 ∈ C, w1, w2 ∈ F
n and permutation
matrices P1,P2 ∈ F
n×n; an integer b ≥ 0.
Output Either a candidate for (w1, w2) or Failure.
1. [Code offset] Let r = P−11 f1 − P
−1
2 f2.
2. [Check Matrix] Compute G1 = P
−1
1 G, G2 = P
−1
2 G and set G˜ =
(G1|G2); find a matrix of maximal rank such that H˜ · G˜ = 0, e.g., by
computing a basis for the kernel of G˜
⊤
.
3. [Find error pattern] Let e1, ..., eB ∈ F
n be all vectors of Hamming
weight ≤ b sorted w.r.t. their Hamming weight, i.e., |e1| ≤ ... ≤ |eB|.
Next, successively iterate through the list until a j is found such that
H˜ · (r − ej) = 0. If none such j exists, return Failure; otherwise
continue with the next step.
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4. [Solve linear system] Compute c˜ = r − ej and solve G˜m˜ = c˜ for
m˜ ∈ Fk+k. Write m˜⊤ = (m⊤1 ,−m
⊤
2 ) where m1,m2 ∈ F
k and set
c∗1 = P1Gm1 and c
∗
2 = P2Gm2.
5. [Return] Determine w∗1 = P
−1
1 · (f1− c
∗
1) and w
∗
2 = P
−1
2 · (f 2− c
∗
2) and
return (w∗1, w
∗
2).
For an analysis of the attack, which can be formulated as the attack de-
scribed in Section 2.5, we refer to Section 5.1 in [4].
3.2 Remarks
Note that Algorithm 1 always returns a feature vector pair if the matrix G˜
has rank n. In this case the outputs may not be very useful. This, however,
assumes that 2k ≥ n which may not be fulfilled for codes that can correct
a reasonable number of errors (for example, see the codes listed in Table I
in [5]). Also note that, if a cryptographic hash value is stored along with
a fuzzy commitment, the attack can easily be modified to only output the
correct feature vectors or Failure.
3.3 Experiments
To show that Algorithm 1 can successfully attack two related records gen-
erated with a fuzzy commitment scheme we conducted some experiments
with an own C++ implementation which has been made public for down-
load; see the appendix (Section 6) for more details. Therein, we considered
binary BCH codes [13] of block length n = 31, 63, 127, 255. The codes were
designed such that they had a minimal distance being capable of correcting
10% of bit errors. Furthermore, we considered Hamming weight bounds b
as input to the algorithm varying between 0 and 5.
For each tested (C, b) we distinguished two cases: In the first case, we
selected feature vector pairs uniformly at random having a Hamming dis-
tance less than or equals b; in the second case, we selected feature vector
pairs uniformly at random without accounting for the Hamming distance.
To the first case we refer as the related case and the second as the non-related
case. For each feature vector pair, we selected two bit permutations and two
codewords uniformly and independently at random. The entries of the fea-
ture vectors were reordered using the permutations and then xored with the
selected codewords to obtain two fuzzy commitments. The code’s generator
matrix, the fuzzy commitments together with their respective permutation
processes, and the Hamming weight bound b were input to our implemen-
tation of Algorithm 1. Whenever the algorithm output candidates for the
feature vectors, we accounted the event as a linkage. If, in addition, the pair
was correct, we accounted the event as a recovery. For most tested (C, b) we
simulated 5000 related and 5000 non-related cases; for n = 255 and b = 5
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Table 1: Performance of the attack (Algorithm 1) determined experimentally
on a 1.8 GHz server with sufficient memory
(n, k, d) b
rel./non-rel. rel./non-rel. rel./non-rel.
linkage rate rec. rate attack time
(31, 11, 11)
0 100% / 0.06% 51.2% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
1 100% / 2.94% 49.3% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
2 100% / 39.1% 45.7% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
3 100% / 99.2% 25.2% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
4 100% / 100% 6.36% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
5 100% / 100% 0.94% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
(63, 24, 15)
0 100% / 0% 50.9% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
1 100% / 0.06% 49.5% / 0% 0ms / 0ms
2 100% / 2.82% 49.9% / 0% 1ms / 1ms
3 100% / 46.1% 43.1% / 0% 3ms / 8ms
4 100% / 99.9% 20.3% / 0% 9ms / 14ms
5 100% / 100% 3.26% / 0% 14ms / 14ms
(127, 50, 27)
0 100% / 0% 50.2% / 0% 4ms / 4ms
1 100% / 0% 49.8% / 0% 4ms / 4ms
2 100% / 0% 50.8% / 0% 5ms / 7ms
3 100% / 0.08% 50.0% / 0% 35ms / 137ms
4 100% / 4.18% 50.5% / 0% 932ms / 3.7s
5 100% / 62.5% 40.9% / 0% 16s / 54s
(255, 87, 53)
0 100% / 0% 50.3% / 0% 29ms / 28ms
1 100% / 0% 50.9% / 0% 29ms / 28ms
2 100% / 0% 50.2% / 0% 35ms / 54ms
3 100% / 0% 50.6% / 0% 465ms / 1.9s
4 100% / 0% 49.9% / 0% 25s / 106s
5 100% / 0% 48.3% / 0% 21min / 81min
only 350 related and 350 non-related cases have been simulated. Thereby,
we measured the average linkage rate, average recovery rate and the average
attack time for the related and non-related case. The results can be found
in Table 1.
Our tests clearly indicate that the fuzzy commitment scheme remains
vulnerable to record multiplicity attacks even if the protected feature vectors
have been passed through record-specific public permutation processes. For
example, for (n, k) = (127, 50), according to our tests it is possible to quite
reliably distinguish records that protect feature vectors differing in at most
b = 3 bit positions from those protecting random feature vectors: In all
related cases the attack output a pair, but only in approximately 0.08% of
the non-related cases. The time that an adversary has to spent before he
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can dismiss a non-related record pair was measured as 137ms. Furthermore,
in nearly 50% of the related cases the attack returned the correct feature
vectors: This is due to the fact that the linear systems solved in Step 4 of
Algorithm 1 had in average two solutions (i.e., the rank of G˜ was 2k− 1) of
which only one was correct. In fact, in all cases for n = 63, 127, 255 observed
the linear systems had exactly two solutions (in some cases for n = 31 the
systems had four solutions). This explains why we measured an approximate
maximum of 50% related recovery rate. We stress that, if a cryptographic
hash value is accessible along with a fuzzy commitment, then the correct of
the solution can be selected in Step 4 and then a related recovery rate of up
to 100% can be achieved.
It is important to note the following. Kelkboom et al. [5] considered
BCH codes that are able to correct ≈ 25% of errors while we consider codes
of ≈ 10% error-correcting capability. We stress that the higher the error-
correcting capability of a linear code, the lower is its dimension and thus its
sphere packing density; consequently, the attack will even be more effective
against the codes considered in [5]. This is in accordance with the results
one achieves using the C++ code example given in the appendix (Section
6).
3.4 The Binary Case
Our observations and experiments lead to the question whether it is possible
to pass the feature vectors through another class of transformation than pro-
cesses reordering the position of the feature vectors in order to prevent the
(generalized) decodability attack. Such class of transforms should preserve
the Hamming distance between two feature vectors in order to not affect
the verification performance of the system. More specifically, we say that a
map T : Fn → Fn preserves the Hamming distance if for all v1, v2 ∈ F the
equality |T (v1) − T (v2)| = |v1 − v2| holds. In Section 4 we construct such
transforms and show that they effectively prevent decodability attacks pro-
vided |F| is of sufficient size. On the other hand, the use of these transforms
may be ineffective for very small finite fields, in particular, if |F| = 2. The
binary case, however, is a very important one and is therefore considered
in this section. Unfortunately, the result of our analysis is that decodability
attacks cannot be prevented in the binary case using a public and record-
specific transformation preserving the Hamming distance because every such
transformation essentially is a bit permutation process. More precisely:
Theorem 1. Let T : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a map that preserves the Hamming
distance. Then there exists a permutation matrix P ∈ {0, 1}n×n such that
T (v) = Pv ⊕ T (0) for every v ∈ {0, 1}n.
Here we denote by {0, 1} the field with two elements and by ⊕ the
addition of vectors with coefficients in {0, 1} which can be interpreted as an
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exclusive or-operation (note that subtraction is the same as addition over
{0, 1}).
By Theorem 1, every transformation through which feature vectors can
be passed are permutations plus a constant shifting vector. Due to the
publicity of the transformations an adversary can subtract the constant shift
from any fuzzy commitment that he has intercepted. Then Algorithm 1 can
be applied to attack related fuzzy commitments as before.
Proof of Theorem 1
First, note that T must be bijective (as a map preserving the Hamming
distance) since, otherwise, there would exist distinct vectors v1, v2 ∈ {0, 1}
n
with 0 = |T (v1) ⊕ T (v2)| = |v1 ⊕ v2| 6= 0 which is a contradiction.
Let Tˆ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, v 7→ T (v) ⊕ T (0). Note that |v ⊕ v′| =
|T (v) ⊕ T (v′)| = |T (v) ⊕ T (v′) ⊕ T (0) ⊕ T (0)| = |Tˆ (v) ⊕ Tˆ (v′)|; con-
sequently, Tˆ preserves the Hamming distance, too, and is thus bijective as
well. Furthermore, since |v| = |v ⊕ 0| = |T (v) ⊕ T (0)| = |Tˆ (v)|, Tˆ also
preserves the Hamming weight.
It remains to show that the map Tˆ is a bit permutation process to which
the following lemma is a key.
Lemma 1. Let Tˆ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a map that preserves the Ham-
ming distance and the Hamming weight. For every list of distinct unity
vectors e1, ..., eℓ ∈ {0, 1}
n, 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, the equality Tˆ (e1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ eℓ) =
Tˆ (e1) ⊕ . . . ⊕ Tˆ (eℓ) holds.
Proof. From the preservation of the Hamming weight it follows that Tˆ (0) =
0, so the statement holds for ℓ = 0. Furthermore, the mappings Tˆ (e1), ..., Tˆ (eℓ)
are unity vectors and pairwise distinct (since Tˆ preserves the Hamming
weight and is bijective). Note that |Tˆ (e1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ eℓ) ⊕ Tˆ (ej)| = ℓ − 1
and since the Tˆ (ej) are all distinct, we obtain
ℓ > |Tˆ (e1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ eℓ) ⊕ Tˆ (e1)|
> |Tˆ (e1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ eℓ) ⊕ Tˆ (e1) ⊕ Tˆ (e2)|
...
> |Tˆ (e1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ eℓ) ⊕ Tˆ (e1) ⊕ . . . ⊕ Tˆ (eℓ)| = 0
and the statement of the lemma follows.
Due to the fact that every vector in {0, 1}n can be written as the sum of
unity vectors and applying Lemma 1 recursively, it follows that Tˆ is linear
and since Tˆ maps unity vectors to unity vectors, it must be a bit permutation
process. 
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4 Countermeasure
In this section, we show which class of transformations can be used such that
decodability attacks can be avoided. The modification may be useful in a
fuzzy commitment scheme working with sufficiently large fields (|F| ≥ 23,
say), but is useless for the binary case.
4.1 Record-Specific Field Permutation Process
Let w ∈ Fn encode a template which we want to protect via the fuzzy
commitment scheme. As usual, let c ∈ C be a codeword of a linear (n, k)-
code C ⊂ Fn. Prior to the generation of a fuzzy commitment, instead of
passing w through a random process that reorders the positions of the vector
w, we propose to pass the entries of w through a random bijection σ : F→ F.
More precisely, write w = (u1, ..., un)
⊤ with uj ∈ F; then we may choose
T : Fn → Fn, (u1, ..., un)
⊤ 7→ (σ(u1), ..., σ(un))
⊤ as the transformation.
T obviously preserves the Hamming distance between feature vectors and
can be used instead of a process reordering the feature vectors’ positions as
proposed in [5].
4.2 Linear Decodability Attacks
To analyze the effectiveness of using a record-specific transformation as
above, we introduce a class of attacks that contain the (generalized) decod-
ability attack as special cases. Let f1 = c1+T 1(w1) and f2 = c2+T 2(w2) be
two records generated by the fuzzy commitment scheme where the feature
vectors have been passed through public record-specific transformations T 1
and T 2 : F
n → Fn, respectively. We define a linear decodability attack to
be an attack that exploits two invertible Q,R ∈ Fn×n (that may depend on
T 1 and T 2) such that the Hamming distance between any feature vectors
w1 and w2 is preserved as follows: |w1 − w2| = |Q · T 1(w1) − R · T 2(w2)|.
Then from decodability of the offset Q · f1−R · f2 in the code generated by
the matrix G˜ = (QG|RG) related f1 and f2 can be recognized and even be
broken with the generalized decodability attack described in Section 2.5.
For the decodability attack (Section 2.3) the transforms T 1 and T 2 and
the matrices Q and R are identities. For the decodability attack against the
fuzzy commitment scheme with public record-specific permutation process
(Algorithm 1), the transforms T 1 and T 2 are the linear maps induced by the
permutation matrices P1 and P2, respectively, while Q = P
−1
1 and R = P
−1
2 .
4.3 Analysis of the Countermeasure
We next show that the probability for an effective linear decodability at-
tack to exist can be very small if the entries of the feature vectors have
been passed through a public, random and record-specific field permutation.
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Therefore, note that, in order to ease notation, it is sufficient to assume that
only one (the second, say) record protects a feature vector whose entries have
been transformed. The key of our estimation is given by the following.
Lemma 2. Let T : F → F be a map. Assume that there exists invertible
matrices Q,R ∈ Fn with |w1−w2| = |Q·w1−R·T (w2)| for every w1, w2 ∈ F
n.
Then T is linear.
Proof. The condition |w1−w2| = |Q ·w1−R ·T (w2)| for every w1, w2 ∈ F
n
assumes that 0 = Q ·w−R · T (w) for all w ∈ Fn. Hence T (w) = R−1 ·Q ·w
and the statement of the lemma follows.
For a bijective map σ : F → F set T : Fn → Fn, (u1, ..., un)
⊤ 7→
(σ(u1), ..., σ(un))
⊤. Then, if |w1 − w2| = |Q · w − R · T (w2)| it follows
from the lemma that T must be linear and thus its components, i.e., the
map σ : F → F, must be linear, too, and, as a bijection, additionally be
invertible.
There are (|F| − 1) · |F| invertible linear maps and |F|! permutations.
Consequently, we estimate the probability that the incorporation of two
random field permutation processes enables a linear decodability attack as
1/(|F| − 2)! .
For example, for |F| = 32, 64 and 128, these probabilities evaluate to
approximately 2−108, 2−284 and 2−702, respectively, which may be reasonably
small to prevent an attacker from successfully running a linear decodability
attack.
Disclaimer
At this point we stress that, although linear decodability attacks (as consid-
ered in this section) can be avoided by incorporating a public field permu-
tation process, there might exist other effective record multiplicity attacks.
Yet, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no known approach be-
ing more efficient than breaking the records individually—even in the case
of equal feature vectors. However, future research is needed to confirm or
disprove the validity of this assumption.
4.4 The Binary Case
The countermeasure proposed in Section 4.1 is useful only if we can assume
that the fields have a sufficient size. However, many applications work with
binary feature vectors. On the other hand, we have discussed that preventing
decodability attacks via a public transformation preserving the Hamming
distance can be problematic in a binary fuzzy commitment scheme.
One solution to the problem would be to use non-linear error-correcting
codes. Then the decodability attack cannot be applied which exploits lin-
earity of the underlying error-correcting code. However, the countermeasure
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proposed by Kelkboom et al. [5] was meant to address the most dominant
linear case.
In the binary and linear case, in combination with record-specific but
public permutation processes, it is possible to flip a few bits randomly such
that the error pattern that an adversary needs to correctly guess during the
attack is expected to have at least a certain Hamming weight. In such a
way the attack might be rendered infeasible. On the other hand, the flipped
bits introduce random errors that need to be compensated by a higher error-
correction capability of the code and thus a lower dimension which negatively
affects irreversibility of the records. Yet, if the dimension is still sufficient
to guarantee a certain security, randomly flipping a few bits may be a valid
countermeasure for the binary case. Nonetheless, other promising solutions
do exist.
Switch the Scheme
Another way to achieve resistance against linkability attacks for binary fea-
ture vectors may be to map them to feature sets, i.e., subsets of a finite
field, which can be protected using a fuzzy vault scheme [8]. Therein, each
position of the feature vector is attached with a unique field element and for
each position in the feature vector that is set to one the feature set is defined
to contain the field element attached to the bit position; this relation has
already been outlined in [6]. The feature set can then be protected using
the improved fuzzy vault scheme by Dodis et al. [6]. It is important to note
that there exist record multiplicity attacks against the improved fuzzy vault
scheme as, too [7]; in fact, each known biometric template protection scheme
is in principle vulnerable to linkability attacks [12]. However, since the im-
proved fuzzy vault scheme may work with fields containing more than two
elements it is possible to pass the feature elements through a record-specific
field permutation process [7] similar to the measure briefly discussed above
(Section 4.1) in a non-binary fuzzy commitment scheme. It is important to
note that when switching to the improved fuzzy vault scheme, fulfilling the
unlinkability requirement may not be a the cost of verification performance
or security and is therefore, in our view, a very promising fix to the prob-
lem. Yet, a proof that passing feature elements through a record-specific
(but public) field permutation can effectively prevent any linkability attack
would be desirable, e.g., by proving a complexity-theoretical statement such
as “the publicity of the permutation processes cannot be exploited to gain
advantage in linking two records as compared when breaking one the records
individually”. Alternatively, we could try to disprove the conjecture by find-
ing an effective linkability attack as a counterexample.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Summary
We discussed the effect of preventing decodability attack-based cross-matching
in a fuzzy commitment scheme by incorporating a random public bit per-
mutation process [5]. We found that the measure does not completely solve
the problem and even can make the scheme vulnerable to reversibility at-
tacks, if the protected feature vectors have a sufficiently small Hamming
distance. We supported this observation experimentally and complemented
our work by proving that there exists no class of transformations preserving
the Hamming distance between feature vectors that solve the problem of
decodability attacks in a binary fuzzy commitment scheme. On the other
hand, we were able to construct effective transformations provided the un-
derlying finite field is of a sufficient size. For the important binary case, we
gave arguments that the improved fuzzy vault scheme by Dodis et al. [6],
in combination with ideas established by Merkle and Tams [7], is a possible
alternative to protect binary feature vectors in an unlinkable and key-less
biometric template protection system.
5.2 Conclusion
Our work clearly states that the mere incorporation of a record-specific bit
permutation process is not sufficient in order to make a binary fuzzy commit-
ment scheme resistant against linkability attacks unless the ineffectiveness
of Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed in the security analysis of a specific im-
plementation: For example, by estimating the probability as negligible that
related binary biometric feature vectors agree in less than a certain number
of bits (depending on the aimed security level) or by guaranteeing that the
code C˜ in the algorithm has a sufficiently large sphere packing density. If
such assertions cannot be made, the protection of binary feature vectors
with a fuzzy commitment scheme seems not to be possible if based on linear
error-correcting codes. Even though we discussed some possible approaches
in order to prevent decodability attacks, future research is needed to confirm
whether they yield resistance against heavy attacks.
5.3 Outlook
In particular, we briefly discussed the use of the improved fuzzy vault scheme
by Dodis et al. [6] as a possible alternative to implement a key-less and
unlinkable protection for binary feature vectors: Even though there exists
an effective attack in the presence of record multiplicity against the improved
fuzzy vault scheme, there also exists a possible countermeasure [7] similar
to the one discussed in Section 4.1. As part of our future research, we plan
to prove (or disprove) the infeasibility of attacking the improved fuzzy vault
14
scheme (with countermeasure) from record multiplicity using complexity-
theoretical arguments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The support of the Felix Bernstein Institute for Mathematical Statistics in
the Biosciences and the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
References
[1] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, “A fuzzy commitment scheme,” in Proc.
of ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security, 1999, pp.
28–36.
[2] F. Hao, R. Anderson, and J. Daugman, “Combining crypto with bio-
metrics effectively,” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 1081–
1088, Sep. 2006.
[3] ISO/IEC JTC1 SC2 Security Techniques, “ISO/IEC 24745:2011. In-
formation Technology - Security Techniques - Biometric Information
Protection,” International Organization for Standardization, 2011.
[4] K. Simoens, P. Tuyls, and B. Preneel, “Privacy weaknesses in biometric
sketches.” in IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer
Society, 2009, pp. 188–203.
[5] E. J. C. Kelkboom, J. Breebaart, T. A. M. Kevenaar, I. Buhan,
and R. N. Veldhuis, “Preventing the decodability attack based cross-
matching in a fuzzy commitment scheme,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 107–121, 2011.
[6] Y. Dodis, R. Ostrovsky, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors:
How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,”
SIAM J. Comput., vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 97–139, 2008.
[7] J. Merkle and B. Tams, “Security of the improved fuzzy vault scheme
in the presence of record multiplicity (full version),” CoRR, vol.
abs/1312.5225, 2013, submitted.
[8] Juels and Sudan, “A fuzzy vault scheme,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inf.
Theory, A. Lapidoth and E. Teletar, Eds., 2002, p. 408.
[9] A. Juels and M. Sudan, “A fuzzy vault scheme,” Des. Codes Cryptog-
raphy, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 237–257, 2006.
[10] W. J. Scheirer and T. E. Boult, “Cracking fuzzy vaults and biometric
encryption,” in Proc. of Biometrics Symp., 2007, pp. 1–6.
15
[11] A. Kholmatov and B. Yanikoglu, “Realization of correlation attack
against the fuzzy vault scheme,” in Proc. SPIE, vol. 6819, 2008.
[12] M. Blanton and M. Aliasgari, “Analysis of reusability of secure sketches
and fuzzy extractors,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 9,
pp. 1433–1445, 2013.
[13] E. R. Berlekamp, Algebraic coding theory. Laguna Hills, CA, USA:
Aegean Park Press, 1984.
6 Appendix
We provide a C++ software THIMBLE that can be downloaded from
http://www.stochastik.math.uni-goettingen.de/biometrics/thimble
and that is licensed under the LGPL. The library provides a variety of
functionalities intended to be useful for research purposes related to bio-
metric template protection. In particular, it provides the BCHCode class of
which objects represent binary BCH codes which can correct binary vectors,
represented by objects from the BinaryVector class, to their closest code-
words within the BCH code’s error-correcting radius. In this appendix we
demonstrate how the experiments in Section 3.3 can be reproduced using
THIMBLE and its BCHCode class.
An executable program that uses THIMBLE may be of the following
form
#include <th imble / a l l . h>
using namespace std ;
using namespace th imble ;
int main ( int argc , char ∗ args [ ] ) {
// IMPLEMENT ME
return 0 ;
}
where // IMPLEMENT ME should be replaced by C++ code. To generate an
(n, k, d)=(127,36,31)-BCH code (which is one of the BCH codes considered
in Kelkboom et al. [5] being of error-correcting capability ≈ 25%), we may
run
BCHCode C(127 , 15 ) ;
int n = C. getBlockLength ( ) ;
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int k = C. getDimension ( ) ;
int d = C. getMinimalDistance ( ) ;
which creates a BCH code of block length 127 being capable of correcting
(at least) 15 bit errors and is thus of minimal distance d = 31. We may
choose two feature vectors of Hamming distance 4, say, at random by
BinaryVector w1(n) , w2(n) , e (n ) ;
int hw = 4 ;
w1 . random( true ) ; // f i r s t f e a t u r e vec tor
e . wrandom(hw, true ) ; // error pa t t e rn
w2 = w1 + e ; // second f e a t u r e vec tor
where the arguments true advise the random() methods to use a strong
random generator (e.g., /dev/urandom on UNIX-based systems); note that
the above C++ code can easily be adjusted to simulate the attack in the non-
related case by also choosing the second feature set uniformly at random.
Two codewords may be randomly drawn from the BCH code by
BinaryVector c1 , c2 ;
C. random ( c1 , true ) ;
C. random ( c2 , true ) ;
To generate two random permutation processes, represented by objects from
the Permutation class, run
Permutation P1(n) , P2(n ) ;
P1 . random( true ) ;
P2 . random( true ) ;
Next, we can construct two fuzzy commitments.
BinaryVector f 1 , f 2 ;
f 1 = c1 + P1∗w1 ;
f 2 = c2 + P2∗w2 ;
Now, assume that we are an adversary who has intercepted the records
(f1,P1) and (f2,P2); we keep track of correct feature vectors and code-
words to be later able to verify the correctness of an output. With the
notation of Algorithm 1, we may obtain generator matrices encoded as
BinaryMatrix objects for the codes C1 and C2 through
BinaryMatrix G1 , G2 ;
G1 = inv (P1) ∗ C. getGeneratorMatr ix ( ) ;
G2 = inv (P2) ∗ C. getGeneratorMatr ix ( ) ;
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and we can compute its concatenation G˜
BinaryMatrix tG = concatCols (G1 ,G2 ) ;
A check matrix H˜ for the code generated by G˜ may be computed through
BinaryMatrix tH = tran spos e ( ke rne l ( t r an spos e (tG ) ) ) ;
Starting from a zero error pattern e encoded by a BinaryVector we may
successively iterate through an error pattern sequence of increasing Ham-
ming weight until for the offset r = P−11 f1−P
−1
2 f2 the equality H˜ ·(r−e) = 0
holds.
BinaryVector r = inv (P1) ∗ f 1 − inv (P2) ∗ f 2 ;
// we use the e rror pa t t e rn from above f o r
// the gue s se s o f the e r ror pa t t e rn
e . s e tZero ( ) ;
// Keeps t rack o f whether a working e rror
// pa t t e rn i s found .
bool s u c c e s s = fa l se ;
// Loop as long as the Hamming weight i s sma l l e r
// than ’hw ’
while ( e . hammingWeight()<=hw) {
i f ( i s I nKe rn e l ( r−e , tH) ) {
s u c c e s s = true ;
break ;
}
// next e lement in the sequence o f e r ror
// pa t t e rn s o f i n c r e a s i n g Hamming weight
e . next ( ) ;
}
// I f no working e rror pa t t e rn has been found ,
// output a message , resemb l ing t ha t the records
// d e f i n i t e l y do not p ro t e c t f e a t u r e s e t s o f
// Hamming d i s t anc e sma l l e r than or e qua l s ’hw ’
i f ( ! s u c c e s s ) {
cout << ”NON−RELATED” << endl ;
return 0 ;
}
After the iteration, we may try to find the feature vectors using the relations
described in Section 2.5 and Section 3 from the solution of a linear system.
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BinaryVector m;
// Solve the l i n e a r system
s o l v e (m, tG , r−e ) ;
// Message v e c t o r s
BinaryVector m1( k) , m2(k ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < k ; i++ ) {
m1. setAt ( i ,m. getAt ( i ) ) ;
m2. setAt ( i ,m. getAt ( i+k ) ) ;
}
// Codeword cand ida te s
BinaryVector rc1 , r c2 ;
r c1 = C. getGeneratorMatr ix ( ) ∗ m1;
rc2 = C. getGeneratorMatr ix ( ) ∗ m2;
// Feature vec tor cand ida te s
BinaryVector rw1 , rw2 ;
rw1 = inv (P1)∗ ( f 1 − r c1 ) ;
rw2 = inv (P2)∗ ( f 2 − r c2 ) ;
// Check i f recovery was s u c c e s s f u l and
// output a corresponding message .
i f ( rw1 == w1 && rw2 == w2 ) {
cout << ”REVERTED” << endl ;
} else {
// I f recovery was unsucce s s fu l , then
// on ly l a b e l the records as r e l a t e d .
cout << ”RELATED” << endl ;
}
In average, the attack outputs in nearly 50% of the cases REVERTED and in
the other cases RELATED. If the C++ code is adjusted to attack non-related
records, then it will with probability very close to 0% output NON-RELATED.
Note that due to the higher error-correcting capability of ≈ 25% of an
(127, 36)-BCH code the attack performs better as for the (127, 50)-BCH
code considered in Table 1 which can correct up to ≈ 10% errors but for
which the attack fails in ≈ 4.18%. We stress that the C++ code example
given in this appendix can be easily adjusted to reproduce our experimental
results from Section 3.3.
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